The Chinese navy has gone through tremendous changes and improvements since the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis. The growing Chinese naval capability is likely to stir a naval arms competition; only time will tell if this will lead to a regional collision. From RSIS.

Since the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese navy, or the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), has experienced rapid change. China has imported and procured many new submarines and destroyers, along with several squadrons of new naval jet fighters and fighter bombers. The Chinese navy makes more frequent foreign port calls and joint sea rescue exercises with other navies. Its submarines have extended their patrol range to as far as Guam and survey ships have been found in the Japan-claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Taiwan areas. Chinese warships patrolled in the disputed Chunxiao gas and oil field in the East China Sea. A Chinese submarine was reportedly to surface within five miles of the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier.

How can these changes be interpreted in the context of power shift? What is the PLAN’s role as a policy actor in China’s politics? How are the changes related to the Chinese navy’s doctrine? How robust is the leadership to support the change? What are the PLAN’s capabilities? And what is the PLAN’s capability to execute anti-access operations in a contingency over Taiwan?

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