Following negotiations, President Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, appeared before the press and made brief statements, but took no questions from journalists (Kremlin.ru, September 28). Immediately after this visit, Putin’s aide for military-technical cooperation, Vladimir Kozhin, made an interesting statement related to the S-400s sale. Specifically, Kozhin explained that “technological transfer between Russia and Turkey is not part of the S-400 agreement” (Interfax, September 29).Sponsored Links
In the ensuing days, the Russian press further clarified that this missile system’s internal control codes would not be shared with Ankara (Gazeta.ru, October 1). This news appeared to somewhat contradict the reported terms of the $2 billion Russo-Turkish deal, which in particular specifies that two of the four purchased S-400 batteries would be co-produced by the two countries.
Currently, hypersonic missiles are being created by the United States, Russia and China, while Australia, France and India have all been reported to be developing the technology.
“The ability to easily circumvent enemy air defenses and deliver an accurate conventional weapon to a target anywhere on the planet within one hour would fill a big gap in current military capabilities,” Lewis says. “They will be capable of evading current missile defences and would result in hair-trigger responses” she adds.
The United States especially has a variety of early warning satellites and missile defence systems which would be rendered largely useless.
A number of issues undermine Ivanov’s analysis and may mask deeper vulnerabilities of Russian air-defense assets in Syria. First of all, blaming the SAA for “poor training” is odd in the sense that the Russian military, with the use of numerous “advisors,” has been actively training the SAA over the past two years—presumably also in the use of Russian-designed and -supplied air-defense systems. Moreover, the Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer author makes no mention of the joint air-defense agreement between Damascus and Moscow, or the fact that Russian VKS operations are mostly intended to aid the al-Assad regime: allowing a foreign power to degrade SAA air defense assets close to the Syrian capital surely represents questionable support. Of course, there may be other factors involved that are not public and that disposed Moscow to effectively turn a blind eye to the incident (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October, 24; Riafan.ru, October 16).
The Israeli action in the area around Damascus on October 16 has apparently not damaged relations with Russia. It has, however, served to again (see EDM, April 10, 11) raise questions about some Russian air-defense assets in the SAA. The Israeli military has proved cautious about undertaking operations in Syria. When engaging targets, it appears to take steps to avoid damage to Russian forces: its air force either circumvents Russia’s air defense bubbles, or simply flies through them. Targeting an SAA-controlled S-200 battery is by no means a game changer, and may have been calculated to send a message to Damascus that the Israeli Air Force is free to act when necessary in Syria and with force protection. Nonetheless, Moscow’s relative silence on the incident is interesting in itself.
Big, grey and boxy, CNC machines use pre-programmed guides to produce intricate parts for everything from automobiles and mobile phones to furniture and clothes. They offer accuracy that human machine tool operators are unable to achieve.
In North Korea, thanks to a combination of homemade technology and reverse engineering, the machines now play a critical role in the weapons programs. They allow Kim Jong Un to build nuclear bombs and missiles without relying as heavily on outside technical aid or imports.
Nuclear weapons experts say this has helped him accelerate missile and nuclear testing despite international sanctions on the transfer of sensitive equipment.
The U.S. has moved closer to selling dozens of state-of-the-art missiles to Japan as part of President Donald Trump’s pledge to boost military support for Pacific allies opposed to nuclear-armed North Korea.
The State Department’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Wednesday it would back the Japanese government’s request for up to 56 AIM 120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs). The sale, which is estimated at $113 million and requires congressional approval, would also reportedly include various logistical, technical, engineering and weapons support services. It comes as Japan reconsiders its traditionally pacifist post-World War II stance on defense in the face of threats from North Korea, which has shot two missiles over Japanese territory in the past two months.
South Korean media say the North has been detected transferring several missiles out of a research facility in its capital amid speculations of a new test launch by Pyongyang.
Citing an unidentified intelligence source, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) reported late Friday that South Korean and US intelligence authorities spotted missiles being moved away from the Missile Research and Development Facility in Pyongyang.
Recent commercial satellite imagery from September 1 and 21, indicates that North Korea continues to work on its second submersible ballistic missile test stand barge at the Nampo Navy Shipyard on the country’s west coast. The intentions in acquiring this second barge and the purpose of the ongoing work are unclear, but there are several possibilities, none of which are mutually exclusive. These include:
In the remote North Korean city of Hamhung, separated from the capital by vast, jagged mountains, an inconspicuous chemical plant may be secretly fueling the growing missile array that threatens the United States.
Researchers think that the plant is producing a specialized rocket fuel known as UDMH, which is used in the long-range missile launches that have escalated tensions between North Korea and the United States.
This would settle an esoteric but crucial debate among North Korea watchers, and not to Washington’s favor.
Federal officials, congressional aides and rocket scientists say emerging clues suggest that, over the years, Pyongyang obtained the fuel, its precursors, its secret formula and its manufacturing gear from China, the North’s main trading partner. Beijing still uses UDMH to loft satellites and warheads and has long exported the toxic substance around the globe.
China has always denied aiding North Korea’s missile program, and the fuel is included on a 15-year-old list of missile-related materials that Beijing has put on an export control list. But a secret report from 2008 that was included in the WikiLeaks disclosures found evidence of an “uneven track record in enforcing its missile-related export controls.”
This article is another example of how China helped North Korea’s missile program.
“The trucks carried the ‘Sinotruk’ logo on the fuel tank and shared some identical features with the Sinotruk Howo 6×6 series trucks shown at the 10 October 2015 military parade,” the report said.
It is the second significant transfer of strategic missile technology from China identified by the panel.
In June 2013 the panel revealed the sale by China in 2011 of six to eight transporter erector launchers, known as TELs, that are now part of North Korea’s first road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile system, the KN-08.